2025/12: Will China step in to defend Venezuela? China emerged as Venezuela’s most important financial backer during Hugo Chávez’s presidency. As the United States steps up pressure to remove Nicolás Maduro from power, the Venezuelan leader has turned to China for support.

As the United States steps up pressure to remove Nicolás Maduro from power, the Venezuelan leader has turned to China for support. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi responded to the growing US military presence by denouncing “unilateral bullying” and reaffirming Beijing’s support for Venezuela’s sovereignty.

The rhetoric is strong. Yet, in a pattern that has become familiar in Chinese diplomacy, Beijing has stopped short of making any concrete commitment to defend Venezuela — despite the country’s central role in China’s rise as a power broker in Latin America.

China emerged as Venezuela’s most important financial backer during Hugo Chávez’s presidency. According to estimates from the CSIS and the Inter-American Dialogue, Chinese lending to Venezuela exceeded $62 billion between 1999 and 2018, which was by far the largest bilateral exposure in the region.

Under Maduro, Chinese buyers have continued to operate in Venezuela, but the relationship between the two countries has at times been rocky. As confrontation with Washington intensified, Caracas’s dependence on Beijing deepened. Yet falling oil prices, chronic mismanagement at PDVSA, the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company, and the logistical complications created by sanctions undermined Venezuela’s ability to guarantee supply.

Even after years of renegotiations and extended grace periods, Caracas is still estimated to owe China around $10 billion in oil repayments. Beijing has responded by cutting its losses, sharply scaling back new financing and exposure to the country.

Yet the value of Chinese investments in Venezuela goes beyond financial interests. By recycling oil revenues into political patronage, the socialist government in Caracas helped construct a regional ecosystem of sympathetic Left-wing administrations across Latin America, institutionalised through bodies such as UNASUR and CELAC, and united by an explicit agenda of opposition to the United States.

A US invasion of Venezuela would represent a clear setback for Chinese interests in both the country and the wider region. Although China is Venezuela’s largest oil customer, Venezuelan crude accounts for only around 4% of China’s total imports. At the national level, Beijing could absorb the loss. At the corporate level, however, Chinese firms which rely on discounted Venezuelan crude would face material disruption.

Financial exposure would also come under strain. Oil-for-loan repayments would almost certainly be suspended, and Beijing would have limited leverage to secure a long-term commitment from any post-Maduro government to honour those obligations. Existing Chinese investments and operations would likewise be at risk, setting an unfavourable precedent for other Chinese projects across the region at a time when Latin America is moving politically to the Right.

China is already the leading trading partner for most countries in the region, giving it scope to absorb some of the fallout from a US invasion. For that reason, Beijing’s response to any potential intervention by a Trump administration is unlikely to extend beyond rhetorical opposition. At the same time, China would quietly position itself to work with whoever governs in Caracas next, seeking to salvage as much of its investment as possible. That posture is something Washington would need to monitor closely if it succeeds in installing a friendly government in Venezuela.

If Maduro were to fall, Beijing might privately regard it as the shedding of dead weight. Even so, such an outcome would starkly expose the limits of Chinese influence when confronted with US military power. Other long-term partners in the region, notably Cuba, would view it as a chilling precedent. In Washington, meanwhile, Chinese inaction would strengthen the case for following through on the revamped Monroe Doctrine, and for pursuing a more assertive campaign to roll back Beijing’s influence across Latin America.